I had a look at some image loading code in kimageformats and found memory
corruption bugs (there might be more):
- oobwrite4b.xcf: OOB write in kimg_xcf:
By overflowing the "size = 3 * ncolors + 4;" calculation, it's possible to make
size == 3 or size == 0, which then allows 1 or 4 bytes to be overwritten:
https://cgit.kde.org/kimageformats.git/tree/src/imageformats/xcf.cpp?id=3f2552f21b1cdef063c2a93cc95d42a8cf907fcf#n484
The values aren't arbitrary, so AFAICT DoS only.
Fix is to move the sanity check for size below the assignment.
- oobread.tga: OOB read in kimg_tga:
By overflowing the "size = tga.width * tga.height * pixel_size" calculation,
it's possible to cause OOB reads later on as the image data array is too small:
https://cgit.kde.org/kimageformats.git/tree/src/imageformats/tga.cpp?id=3f2552f21b1cdef063c2a93cc95d42a8cf907fcf#n192
Fix is to use a 64bit integer instead.
- oobwrite4b.tga/oobwrite507.tga: OOB write in kimg_tga
If RLE is enabled, any size checks are skipped, so it's possible to write
either 128 repetitions of an arbitrary four byte value (oobwrite4b.tga)
or or 507 arbitrary bytes (oobwrite507.tga) out of bounds.
https://cgit.kde.org/kimageformats.git/tree/src/imageformats/tga.cpp?id=3f2552f21b1cdef063c2a93cc95d42a8cf907fcf#n209
Fix is to check for "num" being negative before reading into the buffer.
Also, bail out early if there is no more data available (reading a 65kx65k px image from 14B data takes ages otherwise)